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(L. 1978 H.B. 1650 § 1, A.L. 1985 S.B. 323, A.L. 1989 H.B. 161, A.L. 2005 H.B. 58)

(1988) Law abrogating sovereign immunity is procedural as it creates no new cause of action but only provides remedy for cause of action whose remedy was previously barred and therefore applies retrospectively. Wilkes v. Mo. Highway and Transportation Commission, 762 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.banc).

(1988) Broken down stop sign constituted dangerous condition of government property and sovereign immunity is waived.  Donahue v. City of St. Louis, 758 S.W.2d 50 (Mo.banc).

(1988) Placement of a folding partition against a ladder created a dangerous condition of property within meaning of section 537.600, RSMo. Alexander v. State, 756 S.W.2d 539 (Mo.banc).

(1989) Public housing authorities are statutory municipal corporations and exercise only governmental functions which are subject to governmental immunity. Privately owned rental property enrolled in rental assistance program is not "public property" and was not within statutory exception to governmental immunity. (Mo.App. W.D.) Tyler v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City, 781 S.W.2d 110.

(1992)  The sovereign immunity doctrine is uniquely applicable to governmental entities and is not transferable to an agent of that entity.  The public duty doctrine holds that public officers are not liable in tort for injuries or damages sustained by particular individuals that result from a breach of the duty that officers owe to the general public.  Automobile accident victim's attempt to intermingle the two doctrines fails.  The abrogation of sovereign immunity in no way implicitly abrogated the public duty doctrine. Beaver v. Gosney, 825 S.W.2d 870 (Mo.App.W.D.).

(1992) A medical center, a not-for-profit corporation, which is not controlled by or answerable to public officials, public entities, or public itself, is not a public entity protected by sovereign immunity.  Stacy v. Truman Medical Center, 836 S.W.2d 911 (Mo.banc).

(1993) Court finds a direct conflict between the state doctrine of sovereign immunity and the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act to extent public hospital claimed to be immune from "patient dumping" claim.  Federal act preempted state sovereign immunity doctrine.  Helton v. Phelps County Regional Medical Center, 817 F.Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo.).

(1993) Doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to regional planning commission.  Where slander is not among the circumstances obligating insurer to pay on behalf of the regional planning under insurance policy, regional planning commission did not waive its sovereign immunity against plaintiff's claim.  Balderre v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. App. S.D.).

(1993) Where high speed chase by law enforcement officers resulted in one civilian death and substantial property damage and personal injury to others, statute that waives sovereign immunity for negligent acts or omissions of public employees in operation of motor vehicles in course of employment does not create duty running from individual defendants to either general public or to plaintiffs individually.  Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo., 833 F.Supp. 1436 (W.D. Mo.).

(1993) Plaintiff may have action against city because official immunity doctrine, which provides that public officers are not personally liable for negligent acts related to discretionary duties and performed within scope of their authority, is different legal concept than sovereign immunity doctrine which waives sovereign immunity for injuries resulting from negligent acts of public employees arising out of operation of motorized vehicles.  Bachmann v. Welby, 860 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. App. E.D.).

(1993) Statute waives sovereign immunity in certain cases, however, statute does not authorize awarding of costs against state agency.  In instances where general assembly waives immunity regarding costs, it explicitly specifies such waivers as it provides in sections 550.020, RSMo, and 536.087, RSMo.  Richardson v. State Highway and Transportation Commission, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo.banc).

(1999) Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be used to establish the dangerous-condition exception of this section.  Hale ex rel. Hale v. City of Jefferson, 6 S.W.3d 187 (Mo.App.W.D.).

(2001) Section does not bar claims for contribution when compensatory damage claims for injuries result from dangerous conditions on public property and a joint obligation on the liability is shared by tort-feasors.  McNeill Trucking Company, Inc. v. Missouri State Highway and Transportation Commission, 35 S.W.3d 846 (Mo.banc).

(2006) Section waives governmental employer's sovereign immunity for its employees' negligent operation of motor vehicle; as official immunity is personal to the governmental employee, the employer is not shielded from liability based upon respondeat superior. Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760 (Mo.banc).

(2009) Operation of a city-owned emergency medical service is a governmental function, even though the city charges a fee for the service; that service provides a general public benefit and serves the public health and welfare.  Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133 (Mo.App. E.D.).

(2016) Charter school's participation in Missouri public entity risk management fund did not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus school bus driver's wrongful discharge claim on discrimination on basis of sexual orientation was barred.  Moore v. Lift for Life Academy, Inc., 489 S.W.3d 843 (Mo.App.E.D.).

(2022) To satisfy the "public entity's property" element of "dangerous condition" waiver under section, plaintiff need not demonstrate a public entity possesses exclusive possession and control of the property if the public entity is the legal owner of the property.  Allen v. 32nd Judicial Circuit, 638 S.W.3d 880 (Mo.banc).