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(L. 1977 S.B. 60, A.L. 2020 S.B. 600)

(1980) Armed criminal action statute which permitted conviction on charge of robbery first degree and on the same facts permitted conviction for armed criminal action was unconstitutional in that it violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Sours v. State (Mo.), 603 S.W.2d 592.

(1981) After reexamination in light of Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), the position of the Supreme Court expressed in Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 is affirmed, that by enacting statutes proscribing armed criminal action and robbery in the first degree with a dangerous and deadly weapon, the legislature intended to twice punish defendant for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. State v. Haggard (Mo.), 619 S.W.2d 44.

(1981) If evidence in case supports both crime of armed criminal action and underlying felony, jury may convict of only one, and jury must be instructed that the two offenses are submitted in the alternative and jury may not convict defendant of more than one of them. State ex rel. Westfall v. Ruddy (Mo.), 621 S.W.2d 42.

(1983) Conviction and sentence for both armed criminal action and first degree robbery in a single trial is not violative of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution where the Missouri General Assembly intended that the punishment be cumulative, regardless of whether the statutes proscribed the same conduct under the test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct.  180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Missouri v. Hunter (U.S.), 103 S.Ct. 673.

(1991)  Where defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and armed criminal action for causing the death of a person while driving in an intoxicated state, conviction was reversed because an armed criminal action requires a culpable mental state of acting purposely, knowingly or recklessly.  Criminal negligence will not support an armed criminal action charge.  State V. Hernandez, 815 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. App.).

(1993) In order for an automobile to become a dangerous instrument for purposes of this section, the operator or user of the automobile must possess an intent and motive for the automobile to be an instrument of harm.  Mere recklessness in the operation of an automobile does not give rise to armed criminal action.  State v. Pogue, 851 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. App. S.D.).

(1996)  Statute is written in prohibitive sense and not as a grant of a right.  McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d (Mo.banc).

(1998) Defendant may be convicted of armed criminal action and underlying crime without violating double jeopardy.  State v. Blackman, 968 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.banc), State v. Flenoy, 968 S.W.2d 141 (Mo.banc).

(2001) Three-year statute of limitations applies to charges of armed criminal action.  State v. Hyman, 37 S.W.3d 384 (Mo.App.W.D.).