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(RSMo 1939 § 6040, A.L. 1975 H.B. 93)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 5929; 1919 § 6337; 1909 § 7068

(1960) Missouri vexatious delay statute held inapplicable to declaratory judgment action brought by an insurance carrier.  Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Davis, 277 F.2d 765.

(1960) In action against surety on notary's bond for damages for fraudulently affixing his jurat on an application for transfer of motor vehicle title containing statements as to ownership he knew to be false, relator could recover only nominal damages where notary's actions were not the proximate cause of injury and judgment denying recovery of damages and attorneys' fees under vexatious refusal to pay statute was proper. State ex rel. Koste v. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore (A.), 335 S.W.2d 510.

(1961) On transfer to Supreme Court, held that notary's act of affixing false jurat was an inseparable and essential part of his fraudulent scheme as used car dealer and was one of several proximate causes of relator's loss. Judgment of trial court affirmed including denial of recovery under vexatious refusal to pay statute. State ex rel. Koste v. Maryland Casualty Co.  of Baltimore (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 55.

(1961) No recovery under this statute can be had for vexatious refusal to pay where there is a bona fide dispute over the existence or extent of liability. Loulos v. United Security Insurance Company (A.), 350 S.W.2d 87.

(1961) This statute applies to suits brought on surety bonds on public works contracts but the penalty prescribed it to be assessed only when the refusal to pay is without reasonable or proper cause. In this case the penalty should not have been imposed. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York v. Appleton City, 296 F.2d 787.

(1962) Penalty provision is to be strictly construed, as refusal to pay must be willful and without reasonable cause as the facts appeared to a reasonable and prudent man before the trial not merely because the judgment, after trial, is adverse to the insurer. King v. Empire Insurance Company (A.), 364 S.W.2d 40.

(1973) Statute of limitations defense is an "open question of law" and refusal to pay could not, to a legal certainty, be considered vexatious. Crenshaw v. Great Central Insurance Co.  (CA Mo.), 482 F.2d 1255.

(1974) This section covers surety bonds and evidence held to support finding of vexatious refusal. Housing Authority of City of Clinton v. Baumann (A.), 512 S.W.2d 436.

(1975) Denial of liability under a fire insurance policy without stating any ground for denial is sufficient to warrant submission of issue of vexatious refusal. Hounihan v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Mo. (A.), 523 S.W.2d 173.

(1986) Actions under sections 375.296, 375.420 and 376.620, RSMo, against a self-insured welfare benefit trust held to have been preempted by provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, section 1144 of title 29, United States Code. Hoeflicker v. Central States, Etc., Health & Welfare, 644 F.Supp. 195 (W.D. Mo.).

(2000) Plain language of statute does not preempt a tort claim for defamation.  Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo.banc).